Can Whitey Bulger Get a Fair Trial in Massachusetts?

Interview on WBZ Radio 1030


This morning, I was interviewed by Carl Stevens of WBZ Radio 1030, the major all-news radio station here in the Boston area. Carl wanted to know what I thought were the challenges associated with seating an impartial jury to try someone so locally notorious.

I talked a bit about how important it will be to handle jury selection properly from a procedural perspective. The list of jury panel members must be made available to the attorneys well in advance. There must be a very extensive supplemental juror questionnaire (SJQ). Finally, there must be meaningful voir dire, ideally conducted by the attorneys, not the judge.

I also speculated a bit about the importance of young people and recent Massachusetts transplants, who aren't so familiar with Whitey Bulger's history in the Commonwealth.
I'll be sure to blog about developments as they seem important.

ASTC Pro Bono Initiative helping bring Baby Doc to justice

Not a Pediatric Medical Malpractice Case

The Baby Doc in question is none other than Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, former dictator of Haiti (1971-1986), following the death of his father, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier. Amid the chaos following the devastating earthquake in Haiti, and the mess that was the Haitian presidential elections, Baby Doc Duvalier somehow managed to fly from France to Haiti, not withstanding the absence of a valid passport. There is a lot of speculation and uncertainty surrounding his decision to return to Haiti. Duvalier, of course, claims that he returned to help his country recover. Most outside observers ascribe to him more pedestrian and self-serving motives. Among other things, there is a bank account frozen in Switzerland containing $6 million in Duvalier's name. It is possible that returning to Haiti might have facilitated Duvalier's access to that money.

Regardless of his reasons for returning to the country he ruled so corruptly and violently, Duvalier was was not met with many open arms, aside from those of the local constabulary. Baby Doc was promptly arrested and questioned by the police. While he was soon released to return to his swanky hotel room, Duvalier's papers were seized, precluding him from leaving the country. Government prosecutors are now assembling a case against him on two broad fronts. The first involves financial crimes against the country, including absconding with many millions of dollars that belonged to the Haitian Treasury or private Haitian citizens. The second set of offenses involve human rights violations, including kidnapping, false imprisonment, torture and murder.

Of course, he'll soon be tried in open court and made to answer for his crimes, right? Not so fast, kimosabe. This is, after all, Haiti we're talking about. The country's political history of colonization, exploitation, coup and revolution is Exhibit A of how not to run a country. (BBC has a nice timeline of the country's history here.) Add to this shaky foundation a major natural disaster and a Presidential election fraught with "irregularities" and you have a recipe unlikely to yield smooth transition and peaceful reconciliation.


Where are we now?

In March of this year, Michel Martelly, the Snoop Dog of Haitian politics, was elected President in a run-off election against Mirlande Manigat (despite the fact that Martelly appeared to have finished third in the original vote). All accounts suggest that this is the outcome preferred by (if not engineered by) the United States, despite Martelly's former ties to the Duvalier family and its regime. As a teenager, Martelly was a member of the "Tonton Macoutes," the Hitler Youth of Duvalier's regime. These teenagers were organized into roaming bands of thugs tasked with intimidating opponents of the regime.

As a young adult, Martelly ran an exclusive Haitian nightclub that catered to members of the Duvalier clan and their supporters. Given this history, those pressing for a full and complete prosecution of Baby Doc (including Human Rights Watch, which published a white paper about how important this case is) have reason to worry about the support they will receive from the new government.

Recent events present even more reason for alarm. The investigating judge in the case recently filed charges against Duvalier without questioning him in open court, in open violation of Haitian law. While Baby Doc is largely to blame for this situation, by checking himself into hospital with "Strongman Flu" every time he had a court date, this procedural shortcoming provides straightforward grounds for an automatic appeal. That is, the case is on very shaky grounds before it even begins. Add to this the fact that the judge then visited Duvalier in his hotel suite and one has reason to doubt the sincere desire of the judge to bring the defendant to justice.


Where does the ASTC fit in?

A few months ago, I was contacted by Brian Concannon, the Director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti. Brian's organization, and the lawyers affiliated with it, are helping the government lawyers down in Haiti prepare to prosecute Duvalier. I connected with Brian because he was looking for some trial consulting assistance as they helped pull together the "ordinance," the Haitian version of an indictment. They had a lot of documents to review and code and they wanted to generate an interactive timeline linking Duvalier's regime to the various human and financial crimes committed during his rule.

At the time, I introduced Brian to some vendors that might be able to help out with document management. In addition, his assistant, Cory, and I went down to Hartford for a crash tutorial on timeline software from Marie Mullaney of Litigation Solutions, an ASTC member and New England pro bono team member. The first major contribution by ASTC will be for a member firm to step in and take over this timeline project. Several folks have already expressed interest in taking on this task.

Even though Haiti inherited its Civil Law system from France, complete with its inquisitorial (as opposed to adversarial) criminal procedures, the country has adopted some rather uniques practices over the years.

First of all, it is possible to attach private complaints to criminal matters, allowing the criminal and civil trials to take place simultaneously. The attorneys for the civil plaintiffs work right along side the government prosecutor to prepare and try the case. This is how Brian Concannon and his fellow IJDH attorneys can continue to be involved in the case. Brian is currently identifying expatriate Haitians, with claims against Duvalier, to serve as plaintiffs in the case. Depositions and witness preparation will be much easier for plaintiffs who live in the U.S.

The second surprising feature of the Haitian system is that this might very well be a full-blown jury trial, as we would recognize here in the U.S. Not a mixed panel of judges and lay-persons, but 12 ordinary Haitian citizens sitting in judgment. This is where ASTC trial consultants will really be able to make a difference. It might feel like an 18th century jury trial, but a jury trial all the same. Over the next couple of years, as the case develops, ASTC members will be at the ready to help with case strategy, thematic development, demonstrative evidence production, witness preparation and jury selection strategy.

The lawyers and courageous citizens of Haiti, who are trying to make a brutal dictator answer for his crimes, have a tremendously difficulty road ahead of them. Many forces seem aligned against their efforts. I only hope that the combined efforts of the ASTC membership can help level the playing field just a bit.

We are, as an organization, tremendously proud of the work that Beth Bonora and Andy Sheldon did for the Ray Killen prosecution, as revealed in the excellent documentary, Neshoba: The Price of Freedom, as we are of the pro bono efforts of all our members. This extremely important effort to bring Baby Doc Duvalier to justice, after all these years of suffering in his country, is an exciting new chapter in the ongoing pro bono history of the American Society of Trial Consultants.

An Oldie but a Goodie: Tips for Voir Dire

In reviewing the traffic on my website recently, I was struck by how much more often one particular article was accessed than any other. I used to write a column on trial strategy for Lawyers USA (formerly Lawyers Weekly USA), and this particular article on voir dire strategy from 2006 seems to be very popular, even today. So, in the spirit of giving the public what it wants, here is that article in its entirety.

Enjoy!

Indirect Questions Reap Most Information in 

Oral Voir Dire 

By Edward P. Schwartz 

October 9, 2006 

In my last column, I discussed many of the advantages of using a 

supplemental juror questionnaire as part of jury selection – the primary 

advantage being that jurors tend to be more truthful in their responses on a 

written form than they are when questioned orally in open court.  

But the written form – at least in courts that allow traditional voir dire – should 

only be seen as a supplement to oral questioning conducted in both a group and 

an individualized setting.  

Group voir dire 

By necessity, group voir dire questions are typically framed as “yes or no” 

inquiries. Jurors are asked to raise their hands if they answer any question in the 

affirmative. Each party notes who raised a hand in response to each question 

and then follows up with questions either in open court, at sidebar or in the 

judge’s chambers, depending on the court’s prevailing practices. 

My first word of advice is not to expect to learn very much from group voir 

dire. The need to ask “yes or no” questions, coupled with the public setting, 

conspire to limit how much information you can get from potential jurors. The 

studies cited in my last column all reveal that jurors lie during group voir dire – a 

lot. Most of these lies stem from an unwillingness to volunteer information about 

private and/or sensitive subjects. 

My second bit of advice is to treat group voir dire as an entrée into 

individualized voir dire. The more often a juror raises her hand, the more 

individual questions she will have to answer. Since these follow-up questions are 

where the action is, craft your group voir dire questions in a way that prompts as 

many people to respond as possible. Instead of asking whether “you or a loved- 

one has ever been a party in a law suit,” ask whether “you know anyone who has 

participated in a lawsuit.” Many panel members will construe a question as 

narrowly as possible in order to avoid raising their hand and setting themselves 

up for additional questions.   

Ask each juror whether he or she has ever been in a courthouse before. 

Almost everyone has been at some point or another. Whether it concerns traffic 

court, small claims court or family court, you should try to learn something about 

each juror’s experience with the legal system.  

Try to keep your list of group voir dire questions short. The jurors don’t want 

to raise their hands anyway. The longer the process lasts, the less inclined 

anyone will be to volunteer information.  

I recently consulted on a trial for which the group voir dire lasted 1½ hours. 

For the last 10 minutes, not a single juror raised his or her hand. Fortunately, the 

questions from my team had been asked at the beginning. 

Some jurors are forthcoming, while others won’t raise their hands unless they 

absolutely have to. These jurors can slip through voir dire because questions are 

almost always phrased so that it is the jurors who raise their hands who are 

asked additional questions. To avoid this, I recommend that you phrase some of 

your questions so that it is the jurors who don’t raise their hands who are subject 

to individualized voir dire. So instead of asking, “Who has a relative who works in 

the health field?,” ask “Who doesn’t have a relative who works in the health 

field?” Even if the voir dire will be conducted entirely by the judge, try requesting 

that the judge mix it up in this way. 

Finally, it is a complete waste of time to ask jurors directly whether there is 

anything that would prevent them from being impartial in the case. Most people 

who answer affirmatively are just trying to get out of jury duty. The people whose 

biases are really a source of concern are rarely self-aware enough to recognize 

the problem. Finally, such questions are usually so poorly worded, and cluttered 

with negatives and dependant clauses, that jurors can’t decipher them in time to 

volunteer a response. 

Individual voir dire 

A good question in a written juror questionnaire typically does not make a 

good voir dire question. The main reason is that while people hate to write, they 

love to talk. An open-ended question on a written questionnaire is an invitation to 

leave a blank space. As I discuss in my last column, multiple-choice and sliding- 

scale questions are preferable on a written form.  

But in oral voir dire, open-ended questions provide an opportunity for jurors to 

tell you who they really are. The goal is to get potential jurors to want to tell you 

about themselves in their own words. 

Don’t ask leading or challenging questions. If you try to put words in jurors’ 

mouths, they will either repeat them back to you or clam up, depending on 

whether they like what you are saying on their behalf. So, if you ask a juror what 

she thinks about the “torts crisis” in America, she will either tell you that she 

thinks it is a “crisis” or that she doesn’t have much of an opinion about it. Such a 

question will not get her to tell you about her own experience (or those of her 

friends and family) with the civil justice system, which is what you really want to 

learn about.  

Instead, ask the juror about the most interesting court case she has ever 

heard about. What case she chooses, along with her take on the outcome, will be 

much more informative than some canned response about “fairness” or “justice.” 

Prospective jurors will instinctively try to figure out why a lawyer is asking a 

particular question. The more sensitive the topic – and the more the question 

reflects the fundamental controversy of the case – the more likely a juror is to try 

to “game” the process. One way to avoid this is to ask jurors to tell stories about 

themselves, as I mention above. Another is to ask questions about topics that 

proxy well for what you are really interested in.  

For example, I recently worked on a case involving the purchase of a firearm 

by someone who was mentally ill. We wanted to learn whether jurors were 

sensitive to the plight of people facing mental challenges and whether they 

believed society is responsible for keeping such people safe.  

To get at these attitudes, we asked a very open-ended question about each 

juror’s recollection of the Columbine tragedy. If a juror did not offer an opinion on 

her own about who was responsible, we followed up with a question about the 

juror’s initial thoughts about who was to blame.  

Some jurors blamed only the shooters. Others expressed frustration with the 

parents. A few articulated the position that everyone (parents, school, 

government, media, etc.) has a responsibility to look out for the well-being of our 

children. The jurors were generally willing to talk about Columbine because it did 

not have a direct bearing on our case. 

Another ripe area to explore is people’s relations with those close to them. 

People love to talk about their children. Rather than ask prospective jurors about 

religious preferences, ask where their kids go to school. To get a sense of how a 

juror feels about people in different professions, ask what their children want to 

be when they grow up. If one answers, “Joey, my 6-year-old, wants to be a 

policeman,” you can follow up with, “How do you and your wife feel about that?” 

A person whose son is on the debate team or who plays in the orchestra is likely 

to have different attitudes than one whose son plays on the football team and has 

joined ROTC. A person who is self-conscious about their own life can still be 

expansive about her children; use this to your advantage. 

There is another advantage to “asking around the topic.” If the other side has 

not thought through the voir dire process as thoroughly, the jurors’ responses will 

be more useful to you than they will be to your opponents. 

Be Prepared for any jury 

I have devoted the last two columns to jury selection strategies. I don’t want 

you to get the idea, however, that choosing a jury is the only, or even the most 

important, opportunity for you to improve your chances of winning at trial. As I 

always tell my clients, in terms of impact on verdict choice, who the jurors are is 

almost always swamped by what the jurors see. By all means, do all you can to 

identify and strike jurors who really will be unfair to your client; but, make sure to 

concentrate  your energy and resources on presenting your case in its most 

favorable light. 

Evidence Driven Deliberations enhance accuracy and consensus

A Missouri jury is confronted with a cold case

In 1976, Becky Doisy disappeared. A man named Johnny Wright was wanted for questioning in the case. The problem was that Johnny Wright was nowhere to be found. More than thirty years later, Johnny Wright was discovered living as Errol Edwards is Georgia and then Texas. 

The state's case depended on the testimony from Wright's former roommate, Harry Moore, as well as that of William Simmons, a man who knew Wright and Moore from a local methadone clinic. So, the jury was faced with deciding a murder case, based upon little more than the decades-old recollections of two shaky witnesses who had their own problems with the law.

A Conscientious Deliberation

Melissa Spain was the foreperson of the jury. In an interview with The Missourian, she discusses how she realized that the jury had a difficult job and needed to be very careful about how they interpreted the evidence. The first thing that Ms. Spain did was review the 12 pages of jury instructions with her jury in detail, taking as long as necessary for everyone to understand what was required of them.

The jury then turned to the evidence in the case, reviewing the testimonies of Moore and Simmons in detail. Each juror was asked to volunteer any ideas and questions. According to Ms. Spain, “It was a room full of logical, open-minded people just really taking it seriously and looking at every possible angle.” 

Importantly, the jury did not take a vote on any of the verdicts until it had thoroughly reviewed all the evidence. After six hours, the jury returned a guilty verdict.

Evidence-driven vs. Verdict-driven deliberations

The story Ms. Spain tells highlights the advantages of evidence-driven deliberations. Juries sometimes focus on the questions of who did what to whom when -- the evidence -- reserving for later the issue of what their answers mean from a legal perspective. Other juries immediately take votes about which verdict is the right one. This tends to turn deliberations into a competition between two camps to see which can "convince" the other to change its vote. 

Ultimately, of course, a jury needs to take a vote. So, deliberations will eventually become verdict-driven. Delaying a vote, however, and keeping the jury in evidence-driven mode has several advantages.

1. More material and relevant evidence enters the deliberations and fewer factual errors go uncorrected.
2. A larger number of jurors participate actively in the discussion.
3. The tenor of deliberation is more inclusive, polite and respectful.
4. Jury instructions receive greater attention and adherence.
5. Jurors report greater satisfaction with both deliberations and the final verdict.

I have seen judges suggest to juries that they not rush to take a vote, which seems to me a sensible idea. As a litigator, you can request that the judge offer such advice to your next jury. If you don't think that the judge is likely to adhere to such a request, you might consider including language in your closing argument that hints at keeping deliberations in a evidence-driven mode as long as possible: "As you review the evidence in this case, combing through the testimony and exhibits, before you know how your fellow jurors will vote, I hope that you will consider..." 

If a thorough jury is a good jury for your case, try to keep them out of verdict-driven mode as long as possible.

The Fifth Amendment vs. The Third Degree

Edward Fleury declines to testify in his own defense

Massachussens, parents and gun advocates have all been following closely the trial of Edward Fleury, a retired police chief, who is on trial for involuntary manslaughter in conjunction with a gun show he organized and promoted. At the show, Christopher Bezilj, age 8, accidently shot himself to death while firing an Uzi machine gun. My earlier posts on this trial can be found here and here.

The prosecution recently rested its case, confronting Rosemary Scapicchio, Flery's defense lawyer, with some difficult strategic decisions. One that faces almost every criminal defense team is whether the defendant should testify in his own defense. In the end, Ms. Scapicchio opted not to put her client on the stand.

When should a defendant testify?

There are a few main factors that a defense attorney must consider when deciding whether to put her client on the stand.

The first question is whether the case is predominantly about "who did what to whom when" (factual dispute) or whether the defendant's conduct was, in fact, criminal (interpretive dispute).  When the dispute is factual, the defendant might very well be in a position to shed light on important questions. It might be very important to the defense for the jury to hear "his side" of the story.

This implicates the next question. Will the probative value of the defendant's testimony outweigh the costs associated with his testimony? Is there another defense witness available to testify to the defense version of events? Is the defendant belligerent? Does he seem shifty or untrustworthy? Does he look threatening? Can he be trusted not to start inventing things on the stand? All of these factors must be taken into account as part of the cost-benefit analysis associated with deciding to have the defendant testify.

The Fleury trial is fairly unique in that almost all of the questions to be resolved by the jury are interpretive ones. With respect to the manslaughter charge, the jury must decide whether running a gun show at which children were permitted to fire machine guns is intrinsically so risky as to be criminally negligent.

Even the three charges of providing a machine gun to minors rest on an interpretive question. There is an exception to the prohibition for when the child is supervised by an adult with a machine gun license. The jury must decide what exactly constitutes "suprevision," as Fleury was licensed and present, but not directly involved in handling the guns.

Mr. Fleury has no particular expertise with respect to these interpretive questions. While he might have been able to testify as to whether he thought he was "supervising" the children firing the machine guns, it seems counterproductive to have him take more responsibility for what was happening at the gun show. Putting Mr. Fleury on the stand therefore offered a variety of dangers, but not much positive value.

The defense rests... completely

In the end, Ms. Scapicchio chose to mount no defense at all. She called no witnesses, relying instead on the strength of her cross-examinations to introduce reasonable doubt into the minds of the jurors.

I admit to finding this strategy a bit baffling. While there might not have been much she could do to counter the factual case presented by the prosecution, those pesky interpretive questions were left hanging. Might she not have called some expert on gun shows to testify that it is quite common to allow children to fire machine guns? Isn't there some sort of NRA guideline regarding parental responsibility for firearm safety when children are involved?

While I certainly understand the defense decision not to put Mr. Fleury on the stand, I think it might have been unwise not to mount any defense at all.

In my earlier posts, I discussed the importance of deflecting blame away from Mr. Fleury, even if that strategy required the risky move of blaming the victim's father for his death. Early in the trial, Ms. Scapicchio seemed to be following this path. Somewhat surprisingly, in her closing arguments, she asserted that the death had been a tragic accident, nothing more. She chose not to directly implicate the father. It will be interesting to see how this strategy plays out.

Blame Avoidance v. Blame Deflection: The Gun Show Uzi trial

Gun show Uzi trial highlights emotional impact of tragedy

The manslaughter trial of Edward Fleury, a retired Police Chief, finally got underway in Springfield, MA this week. The trial stems from a fatal accident at a gun show organized by Mr. Fleury, at which an 8-year-old boy, Christopher Bizilj, fatally shot himself with a lightweight Uzi submachine gun.

Prior to the original start date for the trial (which was delayed for over a month), I wrote a blog post in which I speculated about the kind of strategy the defense would have to employ in this case. Both Fleury and the two men who supplied the gun in question (who face similar charges in a separate trial) can mount legitimate defenses to the charges against them. While the boy’s death was certainly tragic and preventable, it is not clear that any of these men violated any laws that resulted in the accident.

In the earlier post, I suggested that it would be insufficient in such a emotionally charged case to simply demonstrate to the jury that the defendant’s conduct was not criminal. Terror management theory (TMT) is a psychological framework for understanding how people cope with the feelings of vulnerability and fear associated with tragic events beyond their own control. You can read more about how TMT applies to jury decision-making here. According to TMT, one of the strongest impulses in the aftermath of a tragedy is to assign responsibility or blame for what happened. Psychologically, we all want to avoid either (1) taking personal responsibility for a catastrophic event or (2) accepting that such horrific occurrences could really be random and uncontrollable.

Blame deflection v. blame avoidance

In light of these forces, I suggested that Fleury’s defense team would need to actually deflect blame onto someone else. This would allow the jury to find him not-guilty while still holding someone responsible. In the earlier post, I suggested that the safest option would be to find some government agency or inspector who had dropped the ball, in terms of allowing the boy to shoot the fatal weapon. People are more than happy in most circumstances to conclude that the “government” is at fault (Just look at the Tea Party success). The problems with such a strategy in this case are two-fold. First, this tragic event involved the direct participation of several identifiable individuals. In addition, the boy’s father videotaped the whole thing, adding to the intensely personal nature of the accident. The jury can actually see who was there when the bullets flew (Compare this with the case of the ceiling collapse in the Big Dig tunnel). As such, the jurors will be reluctant to assign blame to someone who wasn’t anywhere near the scene.

The second problem with such a strategy is that there is a lot of blame to go around. This poor boy shot his own head off in front of his whole family. Even if jurors were inclined to blame the state agency responsible for certifying gun shows and the person who permitted this one, they would still have plenty of anger left over for Mr. Fleury.

Given the unlikelihood of success from blaming a faceless bureaucracy for the boy’s death, Mr. Fleury’s defense team had little choice but to adopt the more dramatic – and risky – strategy of blaming the boy’s father for signing his 8-year-old son up to shoot the Uzi in the first place. The message has to be, “What kind of man gives his own little boy a submachine gun if the kid has no idea how to use it?” The entire defense strategy is that everyone at the gun show only did what Mr. Bizilj asked them to. He – the father – was in control of the situation at all times.

Fleury Defense Team reaches for the brass ring

The trial has been going on for a few days now and, unsurprisingly, Mr. Fleury’s defense attorney, Rosemary Scapicchio, has adopted precisely this strategy. She highlighted in her opening statement that every discretionary decision at the gun show regarding Christopher Bizilj was made by his father. In cross-examining prosecution witnesses, she has emphasized the normalcy of the gun show prior to Chistopher picking up the fatal gun. She is trying to emphasize that everything at the show was running smoothly until Mr. Bizilj encouraged his son to take the uzi.

This strategy is fraught with danger, however. Beyond the obvious backlash associated with “blaming the victim,” Ms. Scapicchio would be wise to worry about reactance from jurors. Reactance is an instinctual response to having one’s autonomy threatened. The jurors might not like being told whom to hold responsible.

I have worked on several cases (both criminal and civil) in which a victim’s parent, or parents, might have been considered at least partially responsible for a child’s harm. My experience with such circumstances suggests that jurors are often quite willing to blame a parent for negligently supervising a child. That said, jurors show a greater reluctance to do so when told to by one side or the other. The key is to give jurors everything they need to draw inferences implicating the parents without actually accusing them directly.

So far, Ms. Scapicchio has not been shy about blaming Mr. Bizilj directly. Perhaps this will set up a contest of sorts between Fleury and Bizilj, whereby the jury will vote not-guilty if they decide the father is more at fault. Just today, the fifteen-year-old boy who was supervising the uzi shooting booth testified that he twice asked Mr. Bizilj to consider a less powerful gun for his young son. I would only be concerned that the jurors will resent being asked to blame the father for his own son’s death. If they feel manipulated into a false choice between the defendant and the father, they might just convict out of spite against the defense team.

We’ll just have to wait and find out with everyone else.

The Hung Jury: American Exceptionalism Strikes Again

Hung Juries: Judicial Flukes or Systemic Problem?

The American juridical system is one of the few in the world that allows for the possibility of a hung jury. All of the "mixed" systems of Europe and South America, wherein a group of laypersons deliberates with a small group of judges, use decision rules that preclude hung juries. A supermajority might be required for a conviction (like 8 votes out of 13), but a failure to secure that many guilty votes always results in an acquittal.

Even those countries that inherited the British Common Law system have largely moved away from voting procedures that encourage hung juries. England abandoned unanimity in 1974, allowing 10 votes out of 12 to determine a verdict. most Australian states have adopted some form of supermajority rule. Only the United States, and our neighbor to the north, Canada, insist on unanimity in jury verdicts.

As such, the hung jury is a fairly uniquely American phenomenon. Estimates of the frequency of hung juries vary quite a lot. Most scholars use an estimate of about 7% of criminal trials. The number is higher for felony trials and higher still for felony trials in ethnically diverse communities, such as New York, Chicago or Los Angeles. Recent estimates for felony trials in Los Angeles put the hung jury rate at over 20%.

An understudied phenomenon

There has not been a great deal of scholarly attention paid to the hung jury. Occasionally, some group or another will try to measure the hung jury rate in some locality or another. It is difficult to get a handle on why some juries hang and others do not because jurors are not obligated to discuss their deliberations with the public.

As followers of The Jury Box Blog know, I am extremely interested in consequences of maintaining the unanimity requirement in criminal trials in the United States. We allegedly celebrate our diversity of opinions and values and yet we insist that everyone on a jury reach the same conclusions.

As one small step in the direction of understanding the hung jury situation in the united States, I have started a new Twitter feed, called HungJuries, dedicated to exploring the frequency of American hung juries, as well as the causes and consequences of juries failing to reach unanimous consensus.

I am hoping that you will find the news articles and scholarly pieces I link to from this account of interest for your own practice. Please feel free to retweet anything you see there and tell your friends about the new HungJuries twitter feed.

Post-verdict Correction for Racial Animus in the Jury Room: Can it be done?

The McCowen Case in Massachusetts

Earlier this month, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unanimously rejected the appeal of Christopeher McCowen, who was convicted of murdering Christa Worthington on Cape Cod. The major grounds for McCowen's appeal was that jurors revealed, after the trial was over, that the deliberations had been peppered by racially insensitive remarks and hurt feelings over perceived racial animus.

While the Federal Rules of Evidence, and most state counterparts, preclude jurors testifying about their deliberations after the fact, Massachusetts has an exception carved out for alleged racial prejudice. McCowen's appeal was allowed under this exception. Ultimately, the Supreme Judicial Court found arguments that racial animus affected the final verdict unpersuasive. New Chief Justice, Roderick Ireland, wrote in his concurrence that he wished the trial judge had conducted a more thorough voir dire of the jurors before making his initial ruling.

Ireland's opinion suggests some optimism that a post-verdict investigation of jury deliberations can be a successful method of reducing the influence of racial prejudice in the criminal justice system. This view is shared by Colin Miller, a professor at The John Marshall Law School, who wrote a piece, entitled Without Bias: How Attorneys Can Use The Right to Present a Defense to Allow for Jury Impeachment Regarding Juror Racial, Religious, or Other Bias for The Jury Expert, in March of this year.

I was one of the commenters on Miller's article for The Jury Expert. I am not so sanguine about the efficacy of post-verdict juror interviews, as a tool of reducing the influence of racial animus among jurors. I reproduce my response below. Comments are, of course, welcome.

The Hollow Promise of Post-Verdict Juror Testimony: Circumventing FRE 606(b) won't overcome racial prejudice

I have read with great interest Professor Miller's article, outlining an argument in favor of loosening the restriction on juror testimony to impeach criminal verdicts, where racial prejudice is alleged. I must say that I am not entirely persuaded that his approach can circumvent the logic of FRE 606(b). Of particular concern is a recognition that any effort at post-conviction relief begins a completely new phase of the judicial process, with new procedures, presumptions and burdens of proof. As such, one cannot easily analogize from forms of trial testimony to juror post-verdict testimony. That is, the jurors are most assuredly not testifying at the defendant's trial. Secondly, I seem to place a higher value on the interests being protected by 606(b) - namely the rights of jurors to deliberate free from state intervention or recrimination - than does Professor Miller.

Even were one able to loosen the bonds of 606(b), I am concerned that holding more post-verdict hearings, complete with juror testimony, wouldn't accomplish very much. This is a very blunt, unwieldy instrument for correcting the ills of racial animus. I outline below why I believe this to be so.

The 606(b) Exception Exception - The Massachusetts Rule

Reading the language of FRE 606(b) (and the state counterparts, which generally include the same language), there does not appear to be any room for impeaching a verdict based on racial animus infecting jury deliberations. Clearly, such animus falls squarely within the "mental processes" language and any jury discussion of racial issues falls under the "deliberations" prohibition.

Many impediments to impartial deliberations that would seem to be much more "extraneous" or "outside" have been interpreted to fall under the prohibitions of FRE 606(b). Verdicts have been allowed to stand despite the extreme depression, schizophrenia and mental retardation of jurors. The most famous case testing 606(b), Tanner v. U.S. (1978), involved a jury that got drunk and took cocaine together during deliberations. If cocaine and mental retardation don't qualify as "extraneous" influences, it is hard to think how racism might.

I was very surprised then to hear that a Massachusetts trial judge was conducting a hearing to investigate the verdict in the case of Christopher McCowen. McCowen, a black sanitation worker, had been convicted of murdering Christa Worthington, a white woman who lived on his route. A few days later, three jurors contacted the defense attorney to report racially charged irregularities in the deliberations.

I discovered that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has carved out a specific exception to 606(b) when racial animus is alleged. Although evidence that a juror made ethnically or racially prejudiced remarks during deliberations is not evidence of an "extraneous matter," the Supreme Judicial Court has held that a judge has authority to inquire into such matters because the existence of such remarks may deprive a defendant of the right to be tried by an impartial jury. Commonwealth v. Laguer (1991).

So, Mr. McCowen got his hearing (Commonwealth v. McCowen, Barstable Superior Ct., April 4, 2008). All the jurors were interviewed. A few racially insensitive remarks were recalled, as were several apologies. In the end, Judge Gary Nickerson was not convinced that racial animus infected the deliberations, something the defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. So, even in a state with the most liberal standard available for reinvestigating a verdict due to racial prejudice, admitted instances of racially insensitive remarks were insufficient to bring the defendant relief.

So, you secured a hearing - now what?

I would strongly advise against relying too heavily on 606(b) exceptions to overcome racial bias in the jury room. There are just too many things working against you. First of all, while some states like Massachusetts have carved out "racial animus" exceptions to the prohibition against juror testimony on matters relating to deliberations, not many of those exceptions were enthusiastically embraced by the state Supreme Courts. A state's official position on this topic could change tomorrow.

Second, all the exception gets you is a hearing (provided you've got solid affidavits from some jurors). Convincing a judge that the verdict was the result of racial prejudice is going to be a bear. The main reason for this, of course, is that the very same jurors complaining about the verdict voted for the verdict themselves (except in Oregon and Louisiana, where criminal verdicts need not be unanimous).

Imagine that you were an African American juror, sitting on a case with racial overtones. One or two of your fellow jurors start uttering remarks that are racially insensitive, maybe even inflammatory. Will that make you more likely to vote guilty? I don't think so. So, the first question any sensible judge will have for a juror who alleges that a verdict was tainted by racial animus is, "Then, why did you vote for it?"

The most likely scenario, leading to a juror contacting a defense attorney and complaining about the racial tension in the jury room, is that the juror experiences regret about the verdict for some reason. That is, after the fact, she comes to wish that she had voted differently. Most likely, she reads about the case in the newspaper, or hears about it on television, and learns some things that did not come out at trial.

The exceptions to 606(b) are not intended, however, to circumvent the other rules of evidence. Judges know this and no good judge will allow juror regret to impeach a verdict. As the judge in the McCowen appeal wrote, "The oft-expressed second thoughts of a conscientious juror do not necessitate a new trial."

Consider the final paragraph in the opinion denying McCowen's motion for a new trial:

"One final observation is in order. For over thirty years, this author has witnessed the delivery of verdicts in serious criminal cases. Watching jurors being polled has shown in many instances, a trembling hand, a tear trickling down, or the word "Guilty" getting caught in a juror's throat. The polling of the jury in this case was extraordinary. After eight days of deliberations, not one juror trembled, or shed a tear or choked on his or her words. Unfettered unanimity was obvious from the conduct of the jurors as well as from the words they spoke as they were individually polled."

Avoiding racial prejudice in the jury room

While Professor Miller spends the bulk of his article articulating his attack on FRE 606(b), he ends with a list of sensible suggestions for minimizing the likelihood that racial animus will contaminate a jury's deliberations.

Remember that 606(b) only applies after the verdict has been rendered. If you wait until then to try to rectify problems with your jury, the horse has already left the proverbial barn. The key is to be vigilant with respect to racial issues throughout the entire trial process.

By all means, follow Professor Miller's advice with respect to jury selection, but I would pay particular attention to his admonition to request a jury instruction regarding the reporting of juror misconduct. While it might not be prudent to mention racial prejudice explicitly, it is critical that the jurors are made aware that the judge is available to help with any issues that come up during the trial and deliberations. The judge should let each juror know that she should immediately come forward if she is at all concerned that she, or any other juror, has seen, heard or done anything that she believes might not be appropriate.

With any luck, you will have a judge who can couch such an instruction in a non-threatening way. In order to avoid reactance on the part of jurors, they must perceive this admonition as a genuine offer to help them work through any issues that might emerge.

Such an instruction can be critical because the prohibition against voir dire for the jurors does not apply until after a verdict is rendered. So, if jurors come forward during any point of the trial or deliberations, a proper investigation into possible racial prejudice can be conducted.

The Dissenters Dilemma: Holdout jurors face hostility and threats

One holdout's harrowing tale

JoAnn Chiakulas was a juror on the trial of former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, charged with many counts of corruption, stemming, in part, from his alleged attempt to sell President Obama's former Senate seat for cash and political considerations. In the end, the jury hung with respect to 24 of 25 counts, finding him guilty only of lying to federal agents.

Despite an apparent agreement among the jurors to simply return home after the trial, eschewing interviews with the press, Ms. Chiakulas found herself "outed" as the holdout juror almost immediately. Forewarned that her house had been surrounded by press, she sought refuge at her daughters house and tried to ignore the incessant ringing of her cell phone. In an interview with Ira Glass on PRI's This American Life, she discusses at length the reasoning behind her position on Blagojevich's guilt, as well as the environment of hostility to which she was subjected by the other jurors. The interview is fascinating and well worth a listen.

Interpretation, Intensity and Isolation

According to Ms. Chiakulas, she was not the only juror to have doubts about whether the state had made its case against Blagojevich. Since no money or favors ever changed hands, all of the evidence against the Governor was circumstantial and open to interpretation. Among the open questions,

What exactly was he asking for?

Was this kind of posturing and horse-trading common among politicians?

Given how emotional and irrational the Governor seemed to be, was he just "talking trash?" 

Again, according to Ms. Chiakulas, the vast majority of the jury had decided by the end of the trial that Blagojevich was guilty of pretty much everything he had been charged with, making deliberations a mere formality. In addition, the jurors discussed openly the pressure they felt from the public to punish Blagojevich for his transgressions. It was, then, through this "fait accompli" lens that most of the jurors viewed Ms. Chiakulas' reluctance to convict.

While the jurors were apparently cordial enough at the beginning, things turned sour when it became clear that Ms. Chiakulas wasn't going to "come around." Pretty soon, she felt as if she were under siege. Pleasant conversation turned to insults and accusations. Her rationality and emotional soundness were questioned, as were her motives. Some of the jurors sent a note to the judge, asking that she be removed from the jury, on the grounds that she wasn't deliberating in "good faith."

When chiding, challenging and pleading failed to change her mind, certain jurors turned to intimidation in order to change her vote. Ms. Chiakulas tells one rather haunting story of a juror who had been sitting at another part of the table for several days. Finally fed up with Ms. Chiakulas' recalcitrance, this juror moved to directly opposite her and spent hours intently glaring directly at her.

Most holdouts buckle

Regardless of whether you agree with the way in which Ms. Chiakulas interpreted the evidence in this case, you have to applaud her resolve under such withering scrutiny. She was the target of intense hostility and bullying, without any way to escape, and she stuck to her guns. Most of us would not hold up so well.

Don't flatter yourself in thinking that you would hold out under such attacks. The data say otherwise. As I reported in a Jury Box Blog posting last year, Nicole Waters and Valerie Hans, as part of the National Center for State Courts project on hung juries, gave out post-trial surveys to almost 4000 jurors across 4 states and got back completed forms from almost 3500. This covered 367 trials. Among the questions they asked was: "If it were entirely up to you as a one-person jury, what would your verdict have been in this case?" It is important to appreciate that all of these verdicts were unanimous, in that all the jurors officially voted for it. Therefore, each "conforming dissenter" (Authors' term) is someone who voted for a verdict she thought was wrong.

The numbers were staggering. Clearly Ms. Chiakulas is pretty unique in refusing to cave in to majority pressure. Here is how I summarized the study's findings in that earlier post:

Remember that estimates of hung jury rates range around 7%. These are the cases with a dissenter who refused to conform. In the Waters and Hans study, 38% of juries contained at least one juror who disagreed with the general outcome of the case but voted for it anyway (conviction or acquittal). This is the most conservative measure of dissent. Juries are often faced with multiple charges against the defendant or a choice among lesser-included-offenses. So, it is possible that a defendant can be convicted, but not of the charge that a juror thought was most appropriate. Taking this into account, 54% of juries contained at least one juror who disagreed with the jury's verdict on at least one charge. That is, more than half of the juries contained at least one juror who voted insincerely. Nearly half of the juries (46%) contained at least one juror who disagreed with the verdict for the most serious charge facing the defendant.

So, when deliberations in criminal cases fail to generate unanimous consensus, the last holdout is more than five times more likely to give up and vote with the majority than to hang the jury. Given the sort of behavior Ms. Chiakulas describes, can we really be surprised by this statistic?

The Solution? Unanimity has to go.

It is important to realize that the majority jurors in the Blagojevich case weren't "wrong." Neither was Ms. Chiakulas. With so much discretion in the hands of a jury, from interpreting the credibility of witnesses, to balancing the relative importance of competing evidence, to resolving "mens rea" issues, reasonable people can -- and do -- disagree. Even when twelve disparate people do succeed in agreeing about who did what to whom when, there is always the thorny issue of "reasonable doubt", a term without a definition. Each juror is free to impose her own threshold. We know from experimental research that there is huge variation in how certain people need to be in a defendant's guilt to vote for conviction.

So, the problem is not that the jurors in the Blagojevich trial could not all agree. The problem is that the criminal justice system forces them all to vote the same way to deliver a verdict. The usual rationale for this requirement is that it instills confidence in the correctness of the verdict. But, as the Waters and Hans study clearly shows,

The "unanimity" of criminal verdicts is an illusion!

Legal scholars are trumpeting something that does not exist. Criminal verdicts are just as likely to be the result of bullying, intimidation, compromise, fear and just plain exhaustion as real unanimous consensus. In difficult cases, where reasonable people can disagree about the correct verdict, real unanimous consensus seems almost completely absent, with verdicts always dependent on some jurors voting against their true beliefs.

Here is what we do know about a system that requires a unanimous verdict.

1. There is a huge premium placed on jury selection, to avoid the possibility that "ouliers" will end up on the jury. This is critical because such outliers are most likely to reach different conclusions than their peers, endangering unanimous consensus. This is really the only argument propping up the morally, ethically and legally bankrupt practice of peremptory challenges.
2. The extensive use of peremptory challenges, along with judicial sensitivity to jurors who might be "biased," results in juries that fail miserably in any effort to reflect a fair cross-section of the community from which they are drawn. Essentially, anyone with strong views on topics relevant to the case at hand will be dismissed. This has a detrimental impact on the completeness and inclusivity of jury deliberations.
3. Jurors who reach conclusions that differ from the majority of other jurors come to be seen as obstructionist. Their views are resented because they interfere with the delivery of a verdict. Many jurors who find themselves in the minority choose to remain silent for fear of the reactions their opinions might engender.
4. Jurors in the majority are placed in the unenviable position of being asked to convert any dissenters by whatever means possible. The judiciary has declared that it does want to know how the jury verdict sausage is made. As such, juries are simply told to do whatever it takes to return a unanimous verdict. Even jurors who don't really want to resort to bullying and cajoling may feel forced to do so in order to satisfy the Court.
5. Lots and lots of jurors in criminal case in the United States are lying to us. When asked by a judge, "So say you all?," the foreman replies, "So say we all." And it's all a big lie that everyone knows about but no one is willing to expose. Why should we endorse a system that forces jurors to take an oath to vote sincerely and then imposes a voting requirement that begs them to violate that very oath?
6. England abandoned unanimity for jury trials in 1968. Did you hear about the riots? That's because there weren't any. Oregon and Louisiana have used non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases for centuries. No riots there either. In Australia, the states that still have unanimity are under pressure from the public to move away from unanimity.

The solution is to move away from unanimity to a more reasonable voting system for criminal trials. For instance, we could require 8 guilty votes for a conviction. Absent that number, the defendant is acquitted. This would, of course, also eliminate the wasteful spending associated with retrials following hung juries. I do believe that that concern that a majority will simply vote for a conviction and refuse to listen to dissent is a real one. There are two possible solutions to this concern. First, one could impose a minimum deliberation time (which would presumably increase with the seriousness of the offense). Alternatively, one could impose a unanimity requirement for the decision to stop deliberating. So, if the jurors are not unanimous as to the correct verdict, but they are unanimous in thinking that further discussion will not be productive, they can vote to end deliberations and render a verdict.

Tragedy, Hindsight Bias and the Blame Game

A Tragic Spray of Bullets
At a gun show in Westfield, Massachusetts, organized by a former police chief, Chistopher Bizilj (age 8) lost his life. Among the guns that two men brought to the show was a small Uzi submachine gun. They handed the gun to Bizilj, who started to fire the gun, lost control, and accidentally and fatally shot himself.

Now, the event organizer and two weapons providers are on trial for involuntary manslaughter in the boy's death. Originally scheduled for trial this month, the case has been continued until December.

The three defendants will certainly attempt to defend their actions as inherently safe and reasonable. Their defense will be that this was a horrible, unforeseeable accident. Such a defense might have difficulty holding sway even among a group of philosophers and legal scholars, sitting around a conference table. The odds are even longer in an emotionally charged courtroom.

No Such Thing as an Accident?
One major obstacle facing the defense is "hindsight bias," a term that I have discussed multiple times in other Jury Box posts. In short, hindsight bias refers to the tendency of people to perceive a highly unlikely, or freakish, event as having been more likely than it was, just because it happened. For instance, if someone gets struck by lightening in your home town, you might come to believe that this is a much more common occurrence than it actually is.

Hindsight Bias tends to lead jurors down a path of irrational inferences. Because people don't like the idea of life being beyond their own abilities to control it, they tend also to overestimate the likelihood that someone is actually responsible for a freakish occurrence, especially a dangerous one. The crazier and more improbable the circumstances, the more uncomfortable it makes people feel. They feel increasingly compelled to assign blame to someone. This results in a rather perverse relationship between the randomness of an event and the need of people to hold someone responsible for it. (This is actually the nexus of hindsight bias and terror management theory.)

One of the greatest fears facing any parent is the prospect of losing a child to senseless violence. A juror will internally resist seeing this event as an accident because doing so only highlights the vulnerability of their own children. While the defense might hope for some support among jurors who are gun advocates, such people are likely to try to differentiate themselves from the defendants. "Oh, a responsible gun owner would never handle a weapon that way. I always lock my guns when children are around. I'd never hand a loaded weapon to a small boy. That's just what the left-wing loonies think we do all the time."

From Blame Avoidance to Blame Shifting
In light of the issues identified above, it will be very difficult for the defendants in this case to convince a jury that the boy's death was simply the result of a tragic accident. The desire to hold someone accountable will just be too strong. The defendants would do well to try to shift the blame elsewhere. This strategy is not without risk and might engender some resentment among jurors. But it also just might work.

The major difficulty here might be finding someone else to point the finger at. One obvious possibility is the boy's parents. What were they doing taking an 8-year old to a gun show? Did his father really let him just take the gun? Had they ever taught him about gun safety? The danger of such a strategy, however, is self-evident. Because the parents have just suffered such a terrible loss, the defendants would face major resentment for "blaming the victim."

Perhaps the event organizer can point to regulations that precluded him from keeping children out of the event. Perhaps the suppliers can point to manufacturer guidelines that identify the gun as suitable for use by youngsters. The gun suppliers have already claimed that Fleury, the event organizer, incorrectly assured them that it was legal in Massachusetts for a minor to fire an Uzi. In addition, the gun club that hosted the event has already settled its criminal charges. This provides an opportunity to assign blame to a party that won't be in the courtroom to defend itself.

Over all, I believe that the defendants in this case will have a very difficult time overcoming the effects of hindsight bias. I fully expect plea deals to be struck before the jury ever gets charged.

Saving Chuck Turner from Himself: The value of witness prep focus groups

Chuck Turner, a longtime Boston City Counsellor, was convicted last week of taking bribes. He was arrested after the FBI conducted a sting operation, employing one of Turner's associates as an informant. Ronald Wilburn was sent into Turner's office to ask for help obtaining a liquor license. While there, Wilburn slipped Turner $1000 in cash during a handshake, all of which was caught on FBI surveillance video.

There are a couple of noteworthy features of the trial. First, the video is very grainy. So, while it is clear that something changed hands, and that it was almost certainly money, there is no way to tell how much. Secondly, Mr. Wilburn was overtly hostile to the FBI during his testimony. While he generally corroborated  the FBI's account of what went down, he greatly resented having been forced to participate in the sting operation and did not try to hide his contempt for the Feds in court.

So, after the Prosecution rested, things did not look good for Chuck Turner. There was, however, some hope that some jurors might have been upset with the way in which the FBI agents conducted themselves. While I rather doubt that any of them would have voted to acquit, I could have envisioned them settling on a verdict centered around minor charges.(Obstruction of justice).

Then Chuck Turner opened his mouth. Despite his attorney begging him not to take the stand, and one supporter literally trying to drag him back to his seat by his suit cuff, Turner insisted on testifying in his own defense. Turner took the stand and proceeded to hem and haw and fail to remember things. He denied small things that had been well-documented and claimed amnesia when convenient. In short, he came across as a smug, contemptuous liar, who believed that he could wiggle out of any situation on the strength of his own charm and guile. Needless to say, the jury didn't buy it.

Any experienced litigator has had a client who just didn't know when to keep his mouth shut. Either the person has insisted on testifying when he shouldn't have, or he insisted on giving a long, convoluted answer to a straightforward question. So, what can be done about a client who insists on talking himself into an adverse verdict?

Typically, such a client has a poor sense about how his testimony will be perceived. Either he simply does not appreciate how he comes across in public, or he fails to anticipate how poorly his style will translate into a courtroom setting. Since many such people are in positions of authority, they are not used to taking directions about message from others. So, how do you convince someone like this to do what's in his own best interest?

This is where videotaped witness preparation can really save the day. Rather than having a hypothetical discussion with your client about what to do on the stand, it is critical to submit the client to a realistic direct and cross examination. Make sure that the attorney you have recruited to act as opposing counsel is very well-versed in your case and really goes after your client. Exploit his weaknesses, trap him in contradictions and let him hang himself.

Once the session is over, review the videotape with your client. In most cases, the witness will quickly come to appreciate his deficiencies on the stand. Where the person continues to be obtuse (or insists he can fix things with a snap of his fingers), the next step is to assemble a small focus group of jury eligible people from the relevant jurisdiction. Show the practice testimony to these subjects and have a moderator lead a discussion about their reactions.

If Chuck Turner's defense team had conducted this simple exercise, I am pretty confident that his lawyers would have been able to convince him not to take the stand at his trial. While he might have still been convicted of some crime, he would not have created a permanent record of himself lying under oath in a court of law.

The lesson: Sometimes it is not enough to tell your client what to expect at trial -- You have to show him.